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Abstract 
 
The paper carries out an empirical analysis of the factors explaining the export 
performance of firms in the defence sector. We focus on the case of Norway, and 
make use of two complementary methodologies: the first is based on quantitative 
firm-level data analysis for the whole population of defence companies, and the 
second is based on qualitative case study research on the three most important defence 
export products (weapon stations, ammunition, electronics). Our empirical results 
highlight the importance of four major success factors for exporting firms: (1) the 
participation in offset agreements; (2) the ability to focus on their set of core 
competencies; (3) their R&D activities and interactions with the public S&T system; 
(4) demand opportunities and, relatedly, user-producer interactions. 
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1. Introduction 
A new literature on firm heterogeneity and international trade has in the last few years 
started to investigate the determinants of export at the firm-level. Theoretical models 
have challenged the conventional wisdom and investigated the reasons why only a 
small number of enterprises within each industry are able to export, whereas most 
others are  not (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et alia, 2004). Empirical works in this new 
strand of international economics and business research have pointed out a set of key 
factors explaining firm heterogeneity and export performance within each industry, 
among which firm size and productivity (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; Wagner, 2007), 
R&D and innovation (Roper and Love, 2002; Aw et alia, 2007; Damijan et alia, 2010), 
and the ability of the firm to interact with external actors such as advanced users and 
the public science system (Alvarez et alia, 2009; Laursen, 2009). 
Although this literature has led to a substantial leap forward in our understanding of 
firms’ internationalization strategies, the focus of this research has predominantly 
been to point out the general factors that may be important to investigate firm 
dynamics for all industries in the economy, but it has so far neglected the study of 
how industry-specific characteristics and sectoral specificities may shape and affect 
firm-level patterns and dynamics.  
While rooted in this emerging strand of research, this paper extends it by focusing on 
one specific sector that has so far received only limited attention in the international 
economics, innovation and business literature: the defence industry. The defence 
sector is in many respects a peculiar market that differs substantially from many other 
industries of the economy. First, defence firms are very heterogenous and produce in 
several different industry segments (Markowski et alia, 2010). Secondly, they invest 
heavily in R&D and innovation, but the lag between input and output of the 
innovative process is often very long (Molas-Gallart, 1997; McLeish and Nightingale, 
2007; Mowery, 2010). Thirdly, the industry is heavily regulated and protected, and 
public instruments such as R&D procurement and offset agreements are commonly 
used to support national interests and domestic firms (Guay and Callum, 2002). 
What are the factors explaining the export performance of firms in the defence 
industry, and how do they differ from the general framework that is typically 
described in the firm heterogeneity and international trade literature? The question 
motivating our paper is not only interesting from an academic point of view, but it is 
 3 
also highly relevant for policy. In fact, a recent EU Directive (The European Union’s 
Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC) intends to provide a new 
framework for policy interventions in the European defence market by limiting the 
extent of national protection, extending cooperation and cross-border trade within the 
EU and eventually introducing a higher degree of market liberalization (Edwards, 
2011). This EU Directive is starting to be implemented by national Member States in 
early 2012. The future scenario of openness and liberalization does certainly represent 
an important change for firms in the defence industry. This makes all the more 
relevant to study their current internationalization strategies, and investigate the major 
factors that may shape their competitive position in a more open European market in 
the future. 
Based on this research and policy background, our paper intends to carry out an 
empirical analysis of the determinants of the export performance of firms in the 
defence industry in Norway. The Norwegian case is highly interesting. Norwegian 
defence companies have in the first decade of the new millennium seen their products 
become hugely popular abroad. Their export has on average quadrupled over the last 
ten years. Why is this the case – is this export success story explained mostly by firm-
level characteristics and capabilities, as the existing research would suggest, or rather 
by external market conditions that have favoured the foreign commercialization of a 
selected number of Norwegian defence products?  
Our empirical analysis makes use of two complementary analyses. The first is based 
on quantitative firm-level data for the whole population of defence companies in 
Norway, and limited to the recent period 2006-2009. The second is based on 
qualitative case study research on the three most important defence export product 
types (weapon stations, ammunition, electronics), and how these have emerged 
historically and come to dominate the export markets in the last few years. The 
empirical results highlight the importance of four major success factors for 
Norwegian exporting firms: (1) the participation in offset agreements; (2) the ability 
to focus on their set of core competencies; (3) their R&D activities and interactions 
with the public S&T system; (4) demand opportunities and, relatedly, user-producer 
interactions. 
On the whole, the paper contributes to existing research in four main directions. First, 
from a theoretical point of view, this is the first study on firm heterogeneity and 
international trade focusing on the defence industry. Secondly, in empirical terms, our 
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work presents new and unique firm-level data and evidence on innovation and export 
in the defence sector (where data availability is usually very limited and firm-level 
information is highly protected and confidential). Thirdly, from a methodological 
point of view, our eclectic methodology combines insights from quantitative and 
qualitative research, and shows how these may complement each other in empirical 
analyses of innovation and enterprise performance. Finally, for policy, our empirical 
results provide information and indications that are useful to reflect upon how defence 
firms will respond to market liberalization when this will effectively be introduced in 
the defence market. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and 
hypothesis; section 3 describes the methodology and data; section 4 discusses the 
results of the quantitative firm-level analysis; section 5 illustrates the results of the 
three case studies; and section 6 summarizes the main findings and policy 
implications of the work. 
 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
The international economics and international business literatures flourished in the 
last decade provide a solid set of ideas to investigate the export performance of 
enterprises. However, most of these export theories and the related empirical evidence 
are rather general referring to firm-level patterns and dynamics across the whole 
economy, and have not so far focused on specific sectors. The defence industry is a 
rather peculiar branch of the economy, e.g. due to the great involvement of public 
authorities and their marked protection of national companies, the very high level of 
technological commitment and innovative investments, and the strong instability of 
demand and vulnerability to external shocks and changing political conditions.  
Our strategy to cope with these specificities of the defence branch is that, while our 
theoretical framework is firmly rooted in the most recent strands of international 
economics and international business research, we will explicitly point out some 
specific factors and arguments that may be particularly important for analyzing the 
export performance of defence firms. 
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Firm size: Recent models in the literature on firm heterogeneity and international 
trade (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et alia, 2004) have in the last few years analyzed the 
firm-level determinants of enterprises’ export activities and pointed out the crucial 
importance of firm-specific characteristics such as size and productivity.
1
 Empirical 
tests of these models based on large firm-level datasets for selected countries have 
largely confirmed their main theoretical predictions (Bernard et alia, 2007; Mayer and 
Ottaviano, 2007; Wagner, 2007). In a nutshell, this literature points out that, within 
each industry, there is substantial heterogeneity, which is mostly accounted for by 
companies’ characteristics such as size, productivity and capital intensity. Only a 
selected number of large firms (so-called superstar exporters) are able to overcome 
the sunk export costs and trade barriers that are faced to sell their products in foreign 
markets, whereas smaller and less productive enterprises are typically not able to 
become exporters. Thus, according to this literature, the following hypothesis should 
hold within each industry:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Firm size is positively related to defence enterprises’ export intensity. 
 
It is interesting to empirically analyze this standard proposition within the context of 
the defence industry. The defence branch is in fact not properly a sector in the 
common meaning of a “homogenous group of firms producing a closely related type 
of products”. Rather, it comprises firms belonging to different product and service 
categories, and it includes both large system integrators and scale-intensive producers 
(e.g. main battle tanks and fighter aircrafts) as well as smaller specialized suppliers of 
electronic components and software. In Norway, for instance, export activities are 
actively carried out both by large oligopolistic enterprises and SMEs. Hence, the 
defence industry is characterized by a firm size distribution that is less skewed than 
what is the case in most other sectors of the economy, and this may possibly imply 
that the above stated hypothesis does not hold within the context of the defence 
branch. 
 
Technological innovation: A large number of empirical contributions rooted in the 
firm heterogeneity and international trade literature have in the last few years focused 
                                                 
1
 This theoretical literature is surveyed in Castellacci (2011a). 
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on technological innovation as a possible key factor contributing to explain 
enterprises’ export activities (Roper and Love, 2002; Barrios et alia, 2003; 
Lachenmaier and Wößman, 2006; Aw et alia, 2007; Castellani and Zanfei, 2007; 
Damian et alia, 2010; Ganotakis and Love, 2011). R&D and innovative investments 
are expected to enhance firms’ export performance for two main reasons. On the one 
hand, they may lead to the introduction and commercialization of new high quality 
products, thus increasing innovative firms’ shares in foreign markets. On the other 
hand, R&D activities may also lead to the creation of new processes that may in turn 
determine higher efficiency in the production process, lower sales prices and hence 
stronger international competitiveness dynamics. According to the existing literature, 
it is therefore reasonable to argue that:   
 
Hypothesis 2: Defence firms with higher R&D intensity have on average a stronger 
export performance. 
 
Technological innovation is no doubt a crucial factor in the defence industry, which is 
characterized by both high private R&D investments and an active public innovation 
support through the procurement of R&D projects and the related defence material 
(Lichtenberg, 1995; Mowery, 2010). However, at the same time as formulating this 
second hypothesis, it is also important to point out two arguments that may blur this 
proposition and make it more difficult to analyze it in the defence industry than in 
other sectors of the economy (Castellacci, 2011b). First, the innovative process for 
defence companies is typically characterized by very large R&D investments and a 
long time required for the innovative project to lead to a reliable and successful 
technological output. The long input-output lag may represent a problem for empirical 
analyses of the defence market, since availability of firm-level data for this industry is 
in general quite limited and certainly not satisfactory in terms of the (relatively short) 
time span that it is typically possible to consider. Secondly, a substantial share of 
military R&D investments is funded by public authorities through procurement 
contracts. If this policy strategy crowds out private R&D investments (David et alia, 
2000), this public support may possibly turn out to lower the efficiency of R&D 
activities and hence moderate their expected positive impacts on export performance.   
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Cooperation with the public science and technology (S&T) system: Universities 
and public research organizations represent an important partner for cooperation for 
innovative firms (Pavitt, 1984; Mowery, 2005). Basic scientific advances produced by 
the public S&T system make it possible to increase the efficiency of the innovative 
process by narrowing down the search landscape and focusing on the most productive 
and technically feasible approaches (Nelson, 1982). Relatedly, by increasing the 
productivity and quality of new products and processes, advanced scientific 
knowledge made available to the firm is also likely to sustain its international 
competitiveness (Laursen and Salter, 2004; Castellacci, 2008).  
This general argument is expected to assume an even greater relevance for companies 
in the defence industry, since many of these operate in science-based fields where the 
contribution of scientific research to technological developments is typically very 
important (e.g. electronics, ICTs, engineering, chemicals, material sciences).
2
 Further, 
the high public involvement and substantial funding efforts in this industry, motivated 
by national strategic and security reasons, is likely to make this type of public-private 
interactions even more relevant than it is the case in other sectors. Based on these 
arguments, we formulate our third hypothesis for the empirical analysis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The public S&T is an important cooperation partner for exporting 
firms in the defence market. 
 
Advanced users in foreign markets: User-producer interactions represent another 
crucial factor explaining innovation dynamics and corporate performance (Pavitt, 
1984). Collaborations with advanced users tend in fact to increase the pool of 
technical knowledge available to innovating firms, while at the same time supporting 
mutual trust, knowledge sharing and hence lower transaction costs. According to the 
original formulation of the ‘home market hypothesis’, it is domestic users that play a 
crucial role to raise the quality of the national markets, thus strengthening the 
competitiveness of firms in international markets (Fagerberg, 1995; Alvarez et alia, 
2009). However, an important recent extension of this argument points to advanced 
users in foreign markets as a key cooperation partner for exporting firms. In fact, 
                                                 
2
 An accurate overview and classification of the different technological fields covered by firms in the 
defence industry is provided by the taxonomy developed by the European Defence Agency (EDA). 
Fevolden et alia (2009) describe knowledge and technological competencies in the Norwegian defence 
industry in the light of the EDA taxonomy. 
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exporting firms face substantial sunk costs and trade barriers when they try to sale 
their products overseas, e.g. due to lack of knowledge of the foreign market, the lack 
of a distribution network, or knowledge of the local regulatory framework. 
Cooperation agreements with advanced users in foreign markets do therefore 
represent a crucial channel to overcome these trade barriers and achieve a competitive 
position in overseas markets (Castellacci, 2010; Ganotakis and Love, 2011). This 
general argument is all the more relevant for firms in the defence industry. Defence 
companies must in fact satisfy highly demanding customers, given the strong 
precision, reliability and technological sophistication that are required for military 
products. Only active interactions between domestic firms and foreign advanced users 
makes cross-order military supply a feasible and attractive option. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Close cooperation with advanced users in foreign markets enhances 
defence enterprises’ export performance. 
 
Focus on core competencies: The core competence of an enterprise is a specific set 
of abilities or qualities that gives the firm a unique advantage and position vis-à-vis its 
market rivals (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). It may refer to a set of technical 
knowledge and skills or some other capability or strategic characteristic of the 
company. It is core capabilities that make it possible for the enterprise to strive in 
highly competitive markets. Focusing on its set of core competencies, rather than 
spreading resources on a broader range of areas and product portfolio, does therefore 
represent an important factor for a firm to achieve a strong competitive position in 
international markets. According to this argument, then, the depth of the knowledge 
search process may be more relevant than its breadth (Laursen and Salter, 2004) in 
order to sustain the export intensity of an enterprise. In other words, large multi-
product firms characterized by a broad spectrum of competencies in several 
knowledge areas are likely to achieve a high level of total exports; by contrast, 
however, smaller producers specialized in a more narrow set of key core 
competencies and products may be in a better position to obtain greater export 
intensity. Since our empirical analysis will focus on firms in the Norwegian defence 
sector, this argument may be particularly important, given that the relative small size 
of the Norwegian market makes it necessary for defence companies to achieve a high 
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degree of specialization in a restricted set of areas where they may have core 
competitive advantages vis-à-vis their foreign rivals.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Defence firms that specialize on their core competencies are likely to 
have greater export intensity than enterprises characterized by a broader competence 
and product portfolio.   
 
Offset agreements: Public authorities regulating the defence industry have for a long 
time made use of offset agreements as a policy strategy aiming at both, the protection 
of national security interests and the promotion of defence firms’ competitiveness 
(Martin, 1996; Markowski et alia, 2010). Although there exists a wide range of 
practices and a complex array of different offset regulations, the main rationale of this 
type of public intervention can be summarized (and largely simplified) as follows. 
When country X imports a certain amount of defence material from a firm of country 
Y, national authorities of country X may stipulate an offset agreement according to 
which the firm in country Y is required to purchase a corresponding amount of 
defence products (or a fraction of it) from a firm in country X. Intuitively, this policy 
scheme introduces an important support channel for defence firms, as their export 
contracts is not only stipulated on the basis of the price, quality or technological 
content of their products, but it also relies on this industrial policy practice. A related 
argument is that, once domestic firms are able to penetrate foreign market due to the 
existence of offset agreements, their presence overseas may also act as a channel to 
build up and develop their own production and distribution network abroad and 
overcome some of the related trade barriers in the future. Therefore, offset agreements 
may in principle have long-lasting and sizeable effects on firms’ export performance. 
  
Hypothesis 6: Offset agreements represent an important factor supporting defence 
firms’ sales in foreign markets. 
 
Demand opportunities: Demand conditions represent a fundamental factor shaping 
economic opportunities in international markets. While the demand for older and 
standardized products is closely dependent on their sales prices and the country’s 
terms of trade, the commercialization of new varieties and technologically advanced 
products in international markets is instead more dependent on the existence of 
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dynamic demand conditions and favourable market opportunities, at least in the early 
phase of overseas commercialization (Malerba, 2005; Von Tunzelmann and Acha, 
2005). However, demand opportunities are quite difficult to account for and predict in 
advance for firms in the defence industry. This is in fact typically characterized by 
fluctuating demand conditions, which are often dependent on one or few big public 
customers, and which may be affected by political changes or external shocks (e.g. 
peace and conflicts; see Guay and Callum, 2002). Our seventh hypothesis points to 
the important and erratic role of demand opportunities in this market.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Demand opportunities may change in the defence industry as a 
response to external shocks, and this is likely to have an important impact on the 
export performance of firms. 
 
 
3. Methods and data 
An appropriate methodology to carry out an empirical investigation of the 
determinants of firms’ export performance in the defence industry must take into due 
account some of the key characteristics of the national market upon which the 
investigation focuses. The Norwegian defence sector is relatively small, with a 
population of approximately 100 firms. Many of these enterprises are SMEs, and a 
small number of large oligopolistic producers dominate both the domestic and the 
export markets. Further, as described in more details below, the export market is 
highly concentrated on a few key products that account for the bulk of Norwegian 
firms’ foreign sales. 
For our empirical analysis, these characteristics of the Norwegian defence industry 
call for an eclectic methodology combining both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
On the one hand, quantitative analysis and statistical evidence enable to point out the 
main stylized facts and regularities that hold for the whole population of defence 
firms in Norway. However, due to the relatively small size of this population and the 
strong concentration of production and export in the hand of a limited number of large 
oligopolistic firms, it is also important to complement quantitative evidence with 
qualitative case study research. The latter leads to a better understanding and more in-
depth insights of the determinants of export performance in this market precisely by 
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focusing on the few key large companies and successful products that have recently 
driven the dynamics of this sector. 
This is the eclectic approach that we have adopted in our empirical investigation. The 
empirical analysis is divided in two interrelated parts. The results of the first part 
(section 4) are based on quantitative firm-level data and statistical analysis 
(multivariate regressions) focusing on the recent period 2006-2009, while the second 
part (section 5) is based on qualitative case study research focusing on a few key large 
firms and crucial products that dominate the Norwegian export market, and how these 
have emerged and evolved in the last decades. This case study research is based on in-
depth interviews realized during the year 2010 with the most important Norwegian 
defence exporters. 
The quantitative analysis (see next section) makes use of a new firm-level dataset that 
comprises rich and detailed information on the whole population of companies in the 
defence industry in Norway.
3
 This database, recently produced by the Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment (FFI, see Fevolden et alia, 2009), is based on two 
different data sources. The first is firm-level account data, providing information on 
some of the main characteristics of the whole population of 100 defence firms, such 
as firm size, revenues, export and R&D expenditures. This is cross-sectional data 
referring to the year 2009.  
The second is survey data obtained from the VIFIN Survey (“Verdiskaping i 
forsvarsindustrien”). This survey data collection work was carried out by FFI during 
the year 2008. The VIFIN questionnaire asked defence enterprises a large number of 
questions (more than 50 items) about their main characteristics, strategies, R&D and 
innovation activities, interactions with external actors in the domestic and foreign 
markets, and internationalization strategies. These questions and the related indicators 
refer to the year 2006. The survey addressed the whole population of Norwegian 
defence firms, and obtained a total number of 45 respondent firms (response rate: 
45%). 
By matching these two data sources, we have obtained a combined firm-level dataset 
providing complete information on these 45 defence firms, which represents the 
sample we use in our statistical analysis. Although this is a relatively small number of 
observations for a regression analysis, it is important to emphasize that the companies 
                                                 
3
 This population is defined as all the firms belonging to the Norwegian Defence and Security 
Industries Association (FSi; www.fsi.no). 
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in our sample account for more than 85% of the total export of defence material in 
Norway. This means that our data sample, despite its relatively small size, is highly 
representative of the whole population of Norwegian defence firms and their export 
performance. 
Our statistical analysis (see next section) makes use of the following firm-level 
variables and indicators, whose descriptive patterns are reported in table 1.  
 
Total export intensity: Total export divided by the total revenue of the firm (year 
2009). This indicator will be used as the first dependent variable in our regression 
model. Table 1 shows that, on average, the total export intensity is above 31%. 
 
Defence export intensity: Export of defence material divided by the total defence-
related revenue of the firm (year 2009). Differently from the previous indicator, this 
only focuses on defence-related sales and excludes all other products of civilian use 
(thus avoiding the well know problem of dual use measurement bias). This indicator 
will be used as the second dependent variable in our regression model, and it will be 
the key variable of interest in our analysis. The defence export intensity (industry-
level average) is around 27%. 
 
The explanatory variables in our model will be measured through the following six 
indicators.
4
 
 
Firm size: Number of employees of the firm in the year 2006. The industry average is 
around 200, although there is a substantial variability in the sample that comprises 
both many SMEs as well as large enterprises. 
 
R&D intensity: Total R&D divided by the firm’s total revenues (year 2006). The 
figures for total R&D include both the firm’s own R&D costs and its publicly funded 
R&D activities. On average, more than 50% of the companies in the sample have 
R&D activities, whereas the mean for all other industries in the Norwegian economy 
is around 12%. This indicates that the defence industry is characterized by a much 
                                                 
4
 Our firm-level dataset does not contain any information about demand opportunities and/or demand 
shocks, which is the seventh explanatory factor highlighted in the model presented in the previous 
section (see hypothesis 7). Thus, our quantitative analysis is forced to disregard this variable, although 
this factor will be closely scrutinized in the qualitative analysis presented in section 5. 
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higher R&D propensity than other sectors as well as a much higher amount of (private 
and public) resources devoted to innovative activities. 
 
Cooperation with the public R&D system: The VIFIN questionnaire asked 
Norwegian defence firms whether “public R&D organizations and institutions are 
important actors for cooperation for developing new products”. The variable is 
categorical and takes four values, ranging from 4 (“very important”) to 1 (“not 
important”).  
 
Advanced users in foreign markets:  The enterprises participating in the VIFIN 
survey were also asked whether they regard “advanced foreign users in the export 
market an important cooperation partner for their production activities”. The 
categorical variable ranges from 4 (“very important”) to 1 (“not important”).  
 
Focus on core competencies: This indicator refers to the VIFIN survey question 
asking the enterprises whether they consider “focusing on core competencies and 
outsourcing other secondary activities” an important strategy to improve their 
performance. Similarly to the previous, the variable takes four values on a scale 
between 4 (“very important”) and 1 (“not important”).  
 
Offset agreements: This is a dummy variable obtained from the question asking 
whether the firms have taken part in offset agreements. On average, 60% of the 
companies in the sample have previously had offset agreements regulating their sales 
overseas.
5
 
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 In addition to the six main explanatory variables noted here, we have also made use of two more 
indicators as instrumental variables in some of the regressions (as further explained in section 4): (1) 
Cooperation with foreign competitors: VIFIN survey question on whether the firms regard “foreign 
competitors an important cooperation partner for their production activities”. (2) Internationalization 
strategy: VIFIN survey question on whether the firms regard “their internationalization strategy an 
important channel to increase their profitability and market performance”. Both variables are measured 
on a scale between 4 (“very important”) and 1 (“not important”).  
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4. Empirical results I: Firm-level quantitative analysis 
The regression model presented in this section analyzes the determinants of 
Norwegian defence firms’ export performance. The variable we seek to explain is the 
export intensity of firms. Specifically, we consider two dependent variables: the total 
export intensity of firms (including both the export of defence and civilian material), 
and the defence export intensity (which only refers to defence sales). The latter 
variable is the one of main interest for this study, although we consider it interesting 
to present the results also for the total export intensity variable. The explanatory 
factors are those pointed out in our theoretical model, and they are measured through 
the six indicators defined in the previous section. 
The regression analysis makes use of five estimation methods: (1) OLS, which we use 
as a benchmark; (2) tobit, a censored regression model that takes into account the 
lower and upper limits of the export intensity variable; (3) median regression (i.e. a 
quantile regression centered at the 50
th
 percentile of the export intensity distribution), 
which is less dependent on the presence of outliers than the previous two methods; (4) 
2SLS, where we consider the possible endogeneity of the regressor “advanced users 
in foreign markets” by means of instrumental variables; (5) IV tobit, which does also 
deal with the same endogeneity issue in a tobit framework.
6
 
An econometric issue in this regression model is due to the possible multicollinearity 
of two of the explanatory variables: R&D intensity and cooperation with the public 
S&T system. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix. Among the explanatory factors, 
the highest correlation coefficient is in fact the one between the R&D and the public 
cooperation variables (+0,49). In a relatively small sample as the one under 
investigation here, the correlation between these two indicators is likely to result in a 
multicollinearity issue and hence a low precision of some of the estimated coefficients. 
To consider this problem, we have run separate regressions excluding the public 
cooperation variable, in order to see whether the results are affected by the inclusion 
or exclusion of this indicator. 
 
< Table 2 here > 
                                                 
6
 We have instrumented the variable “advanced users in foreign markets” by means of two indicators 
(see definition and source in section 3): (1) the importance of the cooperation with foreign competitors; 
(2) the importance of the firm’s internationalization strategy for its market performance. Both of these 
instrumental variables are significantly correlated with the endogenous variable in the first-stage 
regressions and uncorrelated with the error term. 
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The estimation results are presented in table 3 (total export intensity) and table 4 
(defence export intensity). As noted above, table 4 is the one of main interest for this 
study, but the comparison with the results in table 3 is interesting and informative. 
The first explanatory variable included in the model is firm size (number of 
employees). Table 3 indicates the existence of a positive correlation between firm size 
and total export intensity, although the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is quite 
low (see columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10). However, when we shift the focus to the defence 
export intensity (table 4), the expected relationship between size and export 
performance does not turn out to be significant (see columns 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20).
7
 
This contrasts with the standard hypothesis formulated on the basis of the firm 
heterogeneity and international trade literature (see hypothesis 1, section 2). One 
possible reason explaining the lack of precision of this relationship is that, in our 
sample, the firms with the highest defence export intensity are not only the largest and 
most important enterprises dominating the Norwegian defence market (Kongsberg, 
Nammo, Thales Norway) but do also include several SMEs that have recently 
achieved a defence export intensity higher than 40%.  As further discussed in the next 
section, some of these small-size Norwegian defence firms have been able to develop 
core competencies and technological capabilities and thus act as specialized suppliers 
of larger domestic and international producers within, among others, segments of the 
ICT and electronics industries (see the case study in section 5.3). 
The next variable presented in tables 3 and 4 is the R&D intensity. In all of the 
regressions presented in the two tables, the R&D variable turns out to be not 
significant. Thus, differently from the standard hypothesis formulated according to the 
literature (hypothesis 2), our empirical results fail to identify a positive significant 
relationship between R&D and export intensity. Our data does in fact indicate that 
there is substantial heterogeneity in our firm-level sample, with some of the top 
exporters characterized by very high R&D intensity whereas some others by 
substantially lower innovative investments. This empirical result (or lack of such) is 
important and will be discussed further in the case study analysis presented in the next 
                                                 
7
 Following the suggestion of one of our discussants, we have carried out two additional exercises to 
analyze the statistical relationship between firm size and export intensity in our sample. First, we have 
included in the regressions the size variable in quadratic form, investigating the possibility of a U-
shaped relationship. Secondly, in order to see whether the largest firms (system integrators) behave 
differently from all others SMEs in our sample, we have created a “system integrator” dummy variable 
and interacted it with the size indicator. Neither of these two exercises produced significant results. 
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section. A more specific but important caveat, though, is that the regression analysis 
presented here refers to the relatively short time span 2006-2009. This may be too 
short a period to enable a proper measurement of the links between input and output 
of the innovative process, which in the defence industry is typically characterized by 
long R&D projects and protracted periods of market commercialization. The 
qualitative analysis presented in the next section will shed further light on this aspect 
by taking a longer term perspective on the historical developments of some of the key 
technologies and successful export products introduced by Norwegian firms. 
The variable measuring the interactions between defence firms and the public R&D 
system turns out, as expected, to be positively related to both total export intensity and 
export intensity of defence material (hypothesis 3). The size of the coefficient is 
higher (and more significant) for the latter, indicating that the public R&D system is a 
particularly important cooperation actor for the development and foreign 
commercialization of new defence-related products.  
The indicator measuring the importance of advanced users in foreign markets is also 
positively related to both total export intensity and export intensity of defence 
material (hypothesis 4). The magnitude of the coefficient is much higher for the 
defence export intensity, suggesting again that interacting with advanced foreign users 
is an important factor supporting the export of defence material, since it increases the 
trust and knowledge exchanges between producers and users, and it enables exporting 
firms to open up and strengthen their distribution network in foreign markets. It is 
also interesting to note that the size of this estimated coefficient is higher (and still 
significant) when the variable is treated as endogenous (see regressions 7 to 10 in 
table 3, and 17 to 20 in table 4). 
Next, the variable measuring the focus on core competencies does also perform in line 
with the theoretical discussion presented in section 2. Firms that are able to focus on 
their core competencies and outsource other secondary activities have on average a 
higher export intensity (hypothesis 5). Interestingly, the size of the estimated 
coefficient is substantially higher (almost double) for the defence export intensity 
dependent variable, indicating that the ability to focus on the firm’s set of core 
competencies – rather than broadening up the technological and product portfolio – is 
a particularly relevant factor supporting the export of defence material. 
The bottom part of tables 3 and 4 present the results for the offset agreements dummy 
variable. The dummy does not turn out to be a significant explanatory factor for the 
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total export intensity (table 3), but the estimated coefficient gets the expected sign and 
statistical precision when we focus on the defence export intensity dependent variable 
in table 4. This confirms the important role of public procurement and offset 
agreements for the export of defence products (hypothesis 6). It would have of course 
been better to employ a more precise quantitative indicator of offset agreements 
instead of a simple dummy variable. However, more detailed data on offset contracts 
are confidential and typically not available at the firm level, so that the dummy 
variable used here does indeed provide interesting (although limited) evidence of their 
relevance for firms’ international activities. 
 
< Tables 3 and 4 here > 
 
 
5. Empirical results II: Product-based qualitative analysis 
While the quantitative analysis of firm-level data points out the most important factors 
explaining the export performance of Norwegian defence firms, the regression results 
are not able to shed further light on one key relevant issue. The export success 
recently achieved by Norwegian defence companies is to some extent the result of a 
spike in demand for a small group of products produced by a limited number of 
companies. Few places is this more clearly illustrated than in the Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs’s statistics on export of defence material. As shown in table 5, of 
the 20 items that the Ministry uses to classify the Norwegian export, three account for 
over 80 % of the defence export in 2009 and were responsible for most of the growth 
in the last decade. These three items are (1) fire control, search, handling and counter-
measure equipment, (2) ammunition and explosives, and (3) electronic equipment. If 
these items are combined with generally available information about the Norwegian 
defence industry, they can be further narrowed down to the following three more 
specific products and producers: (1) weapon stations produced by Kongsberg, (2) 
large and medium caliber ammunition by Nammo, and (3) electronic equipment, i.e. 
an assortment of sensor and communications equipment produced by Kongsberg and 
a group of small and medium-sized defence contractors, such as Thales Norway and 
Simrad Optronics. This section will focus on these three key Norwegian products. The 
case study research will take a long-run perspective on the historical emergence and 
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later development of these products, point out some of their technological 
characteristics, focus on the firms that produced and commercialized them, and 
discuss the main reasons explaining the export success in each of these cases. This 
qualitative product-based analysis is expected to complement and refine the results of 
the quantitative data analysis. 
 
< Table 5 here > 
 
5.1 Weapon stations 
Remotely-controlled weapon stations (RWS) are systems that allow an operator to 
control a turret-mounted weapon system from inside a vehicle or a vessel. A typical 
configuration of such a system is lightly armored vehicle like a Stryker with a heavy 
machine gun mounted on top of the roof. Although the most frequently stated purpose 
of employing a weapon station is to move the gunner from a vulnerable position on 
top of the vehicle to a protected position inside, the weapon station can also be 
equipped with sophisticated sensors that have the added benefit of improving the 
gunner’s firing accuracy and enabling the crew inside to get a more detailed and 
comprehensive view of the outside battlefield. 
The Norwegian engagement with remotely-controlled weapon stations can be traced 
back at least to the early 1990s (Andås, 2006). In the early 1990s, the Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment (FFI), a public research organization, initiated a 
project to develop the first Norwegian remotely-controlled weapon station. 
Nevertheless, the researchers at FFI did not intend for this weapon station to provide 
the armed forces with offensive capabilities. Rather, they developed the weapon 
station to serve as an explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) system. The researchers at 
FFI envisioned that if the Norwegian airports were attacked, Norway would need a 
unit to clear the runways of unexploded bombs so that the airfields could be swiftly 
rebuilt, and they believed that a remotely-controlled weapon station would be ideal to 
set off these unexploded bombs without endangering the personnel. To aid them, FFI 
engaged the private defence contractor, Vinghøeg, which helped them develop and 
produce the first versions of this EOD system, a system that would later be adopted by 
the Norwegian armed forces – under the designation Advanced Multi Role Weapon 
Station (AMRWS) – and deployed, among others, in Kosovo and Afghanistan.  
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Although the initial idea was to use the weapon station for explosive ordinance 
disposal, Vinghøeg soon realized that the same system could have a broader 
commercial potential as a more offensive system (Dagsavisen, 2011). Nevertheless, to 
realize this ambition, Vinghøeg needed access to both large-scale production facilities 
and a considerable marketing apparatus. Since Vinghøeg was a medium-sized defence 
contractor, it felt it had to solicit help from a larger company and chose to ask 
Kongsberg –the largest Norwegian defence company – to join them in an effort to 
industrialize this new type of weapon station. Kongsberg accepted Vinghøeg’s 
invitation and together they had by the end of the 1990s developed a working 
prototype weapon station, which could be mounted on most military vehicles and 
control a small to medium caliber weapon. In the process, Kongsberg also bought the 
rights from Vinghøeg and became the prime contractor for the Norwegian weapon 
station that would later be marketed under the name ‘Protector.’       
In the same time span, there were other developments, across the Atlantic, that serve 
to explain why Kongsberg’s weapon station become such an commercial success – 
developments that were closely linked to ideas about military transformation and 
counter insurgency. After the cold war ended, the US no longer faced a threat from an 
opposing super power and was, as many of its allies, struggling with a military force 
that seemed ill equipped to tackle its new security related challenges. As part of the 
ensuing debate a concept of military transformation emerged. Although military 
transformation has, by some authors, been described as one of the more ambiguous 
and ill-defined concepts in military terminology, some ideas that would be important 
to Kongsberg’s success have been proposed under this banner: the need for forces that 
combined a long reach and short response time with adequate protection and lethality. 
One of the lessons that the US drew from the conflicts it was engaged in during the 
1990s was that its armed forces was either too heavy and immobile as the armored 
regiments sent to the Persian Gulf, which took six months to deploy, or too light and 
vulnerable as the infantry forces that were deployed in Mogadishu, Somalia, which 
suffered the loss of several soldiers’ life (US General Accounting Office, 2002).    
To remedy this situation, the US Army started as early as 1999 to develop what would 
later be called ‘interim brigade combat teams,’ a new type of forces that supposedly 
“could more rapidly deploy and effectively operate in all types of military operations”. 
As part of the development of these “new type of forces,” the Army awarded, in 2000, 
General Dynamics a contract for the production of an ‘Interim Armored Vehicle,’ 
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which would later receive the name Stryker.
8
 The Stryker armored fighting vehicle 
provided an unforeseen and exceptional opportunity for Kongsberg. It consisted of a 
family of ten different vehicle variants, and General Dynamics decided to attach a 
Kongsberg made weapon station on six of them (Gourley, 2006). Why General 
Dynamics chose Kongsberg’s weapon stations instead of one of its competitors is still 
debated: one part of the explanation is certainly that Kongsberg had a very capable 
weapon station and another part is that General Dynamics used the opportunity to 
fulfill some offset obligations that it had to Norway.  
Another part of the story of the weapon station’s success started shortly afterwards, 
when two aircrafts crashed into the World Trade center. In response to these terrorist 
attacks and as part of a changed political climate, the US chose to engage in two wars 
in close succession – one in Afghanistan in 2001 and another in Iraq in 2003. 
Although the US and its allies won the conventional part of these wars fairly swiftly, 
they got drawn into a prolonged and challenging nation building process afterwards, 
where insurgents relentlessly attacked their troops and tried to hamper their 
reconstruction efforts. In the ensuing counter-insurgency warfare, the US deployed its 
interim brigade combat teams
9
, and the Stryker and especially the Kongsberg weapon 
station proved to be well suited to these operations, providing the right type of 
protection and firepower to counter hit-and-run attacks in populated areas. This 
experience led the US armed forces not only to place orders for more Strykers with 
Kongsberg weapon stations, but also to award Kongsberg contracts for installing 
weapon station on other types of military vehicles (Gourley, 2006). The ensuing spike 
in demand also ensured Norway a high level of exports, as the delivery schedule 
demanded that all available production capacity had to be used and trade barriers, 
such as the ‘Buy American Act,’ had to be more leniently enforced.10 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 More precisely, it awarded the contract to a joint venture between General Motors Defense and 
General Dynamics Land Systems, but General Dynamics would later acquire General Motors Defense. 
9
 These units were at that time referred to as Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and the first of these 
teams were deployed in Mosul, Iraq in 2003. 
 
10
 Nevertheless, this leniency seems to have been a temporary measure, as Kongsberg and its sub-
contractors have been encouraged to build production facilities in the US for the production of future 
weapon stations.     
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5.2 Medium and large caliber ammunition  
Medium and large caliber ammunition is a product category which is usually 
described as ranging from 12.7 mm rounds for heavy machine guns up to 155 mm 
shells for artillery cannons. Medium and large caliber ammunition differs from its 
small caliber counterparts not only in size, but also in underlying technology. The 
increased dimensions allow for an inclusion of among others mechanical devices and 
energetic compounds in the projectile that provides this type of ammunition with a 
broader range of capabilities. And it is common to divide this type of ammunition into 
categories based on the compounds they carry or the effect they produce – such as 
armor-piercing, high explosive and incendiary ammunition. Although medium and 
large caliber ammunition is a broad category, the Norwegian export success stems 
from three fairly specialized products produced by Nammo Raufoss – 12.7 mm MP 
(multi-purpose) ammunition (for heavy machine guns and specialized sniper rifles), 
30 mm MP ammunition (for the main cannon of armored personnel carriers) and M72 
LAW (light anti-tank weapon) (which is a portable, shoulder fired, recoilless rifle
11
).      
The 12.7 mm and 30 mm MP ammunition were not developed as isolated projects 
(Strandli, 2010). Rather they emerged from a larger multi-purpose concept that was 
conceived at Raufoss during the 1960s. The concept was discovered in two steps and 
the first was taken in the mid-1960s, when Raufoss was asked by the Norwegian 
armed forces to evaluate ammunition for their F-5 fighter-bomber. At that time, one 
of the scenarios that policy makers feared was that the Soviet Union would use 
Russian trawler boats, which were frequently observed outside the Norwegian cost, to 
disguise an invasion force. Raufoss therefore carry out tests of two proposed types of 
ammunition against a model of a trawler shipside – armor-piercing incendiary which 
they concluded would only penetrate the vessel without doing much damage and high 
explosive incendiary, which would explode outside the vessel and leave only a small 
bulge in the shipside. Nevertheless, the technicians of Raufoss also tried some 
practice rounds against the model, and they found that this ammunition would 
disintegrate as it penetrated the shipside and bring along a swarm of fragments into 
the vessel – a highly desirable effect. The result was that Raufoss developed a 
                                                 
11
 M72 is sometimes called a “bazooka,” rocket propelled grenade or rocket launcher as the purpose 
and looks of the weapons are quite similar. Nevertheless, this is not completely correct, since the M72 
fires a projectile and not a rocket. 
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modified “training-ammunition” filled with incendiary charges that the air force 
adopted for its fighter-bombers.  
The second step was taken in the late 1960s, when Raufoss was developing the same 
type of incendiary ammunition for use in the Army’s air-defence cannons (Strandli, 
2010
12
). On request from the Army, Raufoss had included a self-destruct charge in the 
projectiles to ensure that they did not fall down and cause damage in friendly territory. 
But when the technicians from Raufoss tested the new ammunition, an explosive 
effect appeared in the target as the incendiary compounds set off the self-destruct 
charge – an effect that according to conventional physics should have been 
impossible.
13
 Raufoss would later find that the explosive effect appeared because 
incendiary compounds caused a violent deflagration (combustion) of the self-destruct 
charge. Regardless, Raufoss was now in possession of a unique type of ammunition 
that had penetration, fragmentation, incendiary and blast effects. Since this implied 
that the ammunition could be used against a wide range of targets, Raufoss named the 
ammunition multi-purpose (MP). Raufoss would nevertheless spend most of the 
1970s – in close cooperation with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
(FFI) – to understand the mechanisms underlying the ammunition’s effects and to 
qualify a wide range of multi-purpose ammunition – including 12.7 mm and 30 mm 
MP. Raufoss also made improvements to this ammunition during the following 
decades, but mostly minor, incremental innovations to make the MP ammunition 
more stable.  
The M72 light antitank weapon has had an equally long, but perhaps somewhat less 
striking development story than the multi-purpose ammunition. The M72 was initially 
developed in the US by the company Norris Thermadore and came to Norway as part 
of a Nato coordinated program in the mid-1960s, where Raufoss was named ‘prime 
contractor.’ Raufoss kept improving the weapon further throughout the following 
decades, through the development of training ammunition and a series of incremental 
innovations to the launcher and projectile. Although, Raufoss experienced a relatively 
stable demand for the M72 throughout the 1970s, 80s and early 90s (Wang, 1996), the 
                                                 
12
 The most detailed and comprehensive account that the authors have found on the development of this 
ammunition was given in a speech held by Kåre Strandli in Ålesund, 15th of June, 2010. Strandli is 
considered to be the father of the multi-purpose concept and this description relies on a manuscript 
from this speech in its account for the development of this ammunition.     
 
13
 To create an explosive effect you usually need a detonator and there was no detonator in the MP 
ammunition. 
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M72 remained a “light” anti-tank weapon, and some military branches – such as the 
US Army which switched to the Swedish AT4 in the 1980s  – considered its 
penetration ability and range to be insufficient to cover their needs. Some of the 
M72’s main selling points have throughout most of its history remained light weight 
and low costs. 
The conditions that led to an increased demand for the M72 and 12.7 mm and 30 mm 
MP seem to be quite similar to that of Kongsberg’s weapon station. The asymmetric 
threats experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan led not only to new demands, but also to 
changes in the perception of the different trade-offs between performance parameters 
in the weapon systems. An illustrating example of this was that several of the 
branches within the American armed forces – which had previously considered the 
M72 “to be too light” – found that the M72 was more than adequate in Afghanistan 
and Iraq where few of the targets were heavily armored. In addition, they found that 
the M72’s low weight and limited size allowed their soldiers to maneuver through 
Iraqi alleyways more easily, and its low back blast enabled them to fire from enclosed 
spaces without exposing themselves to hostile fire (Defence Industry Daily, 2005). 
The 12.7 mm MP also seemed well adapted to the urban warfare in Iraq and the 
mountain warfare in Afghanistan, as its penetration ability enabled soldiers to take out 
enemies hiding behind brick walls and its explosive and incendiary effects, to set 
technicals ablaze (Pick-up trucks with a mounted machine-gun). In addition the MP 
ammunition’s explosive and incendiary effects have been reported to have had a 
demoralizing effect (psychological) effect. All of these reasons seem to have led to an 
increased demand for the M72 and 12.7 mm and 30 mm MP among several of the 
countries operating in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
5.3 Electronics 
Military electronics is a product category that is almost as wide-ranging as civilian 
electronics. It includes everything from underwater sonar to space-based satellites, 
from small microchips to large-scale surveillance systems. Compared to this spectrum 
of diverse electronics products, the Norwegian defence contractors operate within a 
couple of narrow niches. Nevertheless, electronics is still the segment of the 
Norwegian defence industry where companies produce the most varied set of military 
products, including a wide range of encryption solutions, tactical communications 
systems, night vision equipment, and electronic sensors such as radars, lasers and 
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sonars. It is also the segment of the Norwegian defence industry comprised by the 
most varied group of companies, including one large multi-product firm, Kongsberg, 
and a couple of specialized, small and medium-sized companies such as Thales 
Norway, Simrad Optronics, Kitron and Saab technologies.  
Although the statistics show (see figure 1) a steep increase in the export of defense 
electronics during the 2000s, the electronics companies themselves emphasized 
during the interviews that they had experienced a strong, but fairly stable demand 
during this decade. They pointed out that the spike in export at the end of this decade 
should be attributed to natural fluctuations in the defense markets and the methods 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used to collect the data, rather than any significant 
increase in demand
14
. Nevertheless, the defense electronics companies were keen to 
point out that the 2000s had been a very financially rewarding decade, and they 
attributed this success to factors such as their ability to focus on core competencies, 
the close cooperation with the Norwegian Defence Research Esptablishment (FFI), 
and exploiting comparative advantages.  
 
< Figure 1 here > 
 
The first success factors that all of the interviewed defence electronics companies 
emphasized was their ability to focus on niche products and core competencies. 
Nevertheless, these defence electronics companies had a somewhat diverse 
understanding of what this focus on niche products and core competencies actually 
implies. Some of the firms maintained that their success abroad could in large parts be 
attributed to building core competencies by taking on the job as ‘systems integrators’ 
for a large and complex defense electronics system at home. One of these companies 
explained that the role as systems integrator provided insights that allowed them to 
better “spec” (specify) their product to meet the needs of foreign clients, and another 
company maintained that acting as systems integrator at home enabled them to 
“productify” the best parts of the system and sell it as components abroad. Other 
companies had yet another interpretation of what a focus on core competencies meant 
and put the emphasis on producing a small number of products and selling them to a 
                                                 
14
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs collects data on the physical flow of goods rather than financial 
transactions. This implies that the companies could have received payment both in advance and later 
than they actually shipped the defence equipment. 
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limited set of clients. One of these enterprises acknowledged that there was 
considerable civilian demand for its products, but said that it had chosen to limit its 
supply to the military market because it believed that catering to civilian clients might 
lead to a loss of focus on military requirements.  
The second main success factor that the defence electronics companies emphasized 
was the close cooperation with the public research organization FFI (Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment). Several of the defence electronics companies 
mentioned that they had collaborated with FFI on defence electronics projects over 
several decades and that the success that they experienced during the 2000s could in 
large parts be attributed to the technological innovations and insights that these 
projects had generated. The important role that FFI has played in Norwegian defence 
electronics has also been highlighted by historians such as Ørstavik (1994), Njølstad 
and Wicken (1997). These argued that FFI established itself as the leading Norwegian 
center for electronics research in the first decades after World War II and that it 
played a pivotal role in establishing a defence electronics industry in the country, by 
involving Norwegian companies in commercializing technologies that it had 
developed, such as asdisc (sonar) and wireless communications solutions. Although 
not all of these products became huge commercial successes, the initiatives fostered a 
strong and lasting relationship between FFI and several of the defence electronics 
firms, and it is this relationship that, according to the companies themselves, gave 
them a competitive edge in the 2000s. 
A third success factor that emerged during the interviews was the ability to exploit 
comparative advantages. Several of the firms said that their success in the foreign 
markets in large parts was due to focusing on product niches where geography and 
history had provided Norwegians with a competitive edge. One of the defence 
electronics companies explained that building tactical communications solutions in 
Norway was especially challenging, since these communications systems had to 
function over long distances, across deep valleys and high mountains, and under 
rough weather conditions. These challenges had forced them to develop tactical 
communication solutions that could operate under extremely demanding 
circumstances, and that again had provided them with a competitive edge in Middle 
Eastern markets, where the customers needed communication systems that could 
operate during desert storms. In a similar way, the same company also explained that 
designing oil installations for operations at the bottom of the North Sea and 
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developing navigations solutions for maneuvering along a treacherous shoreline, had 
helped them build better combat management systems for submarines and surface 
vessels. Lastly, one of the defence electronics companies also emphasized “cultural 
competencies” as another Norwegian comparative advantage. According to this 
argument, Norway is a small open economy that relies on extensive trade with other 
countries, and has therefore developed an acute awareness of other countries culture 
and needs. These cultural competencies had according to this company helped them 
gain contracts by better specifying their products to their customer’s needs and giving 
a better impression of their company by behaving according to their clients’ customs. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
The paper has carried out an empirical analysis of the main factors explaining the 
export performance of firms in the defence sector in Norway. After a presentation of 
our theoretical framework and hypotheses (section 2) and the data and methodology 
(section 3), the paper has presented the results of two complementary analyses. The 
first is based on quantitative firm-level data for the whole population of defence 
companies in Norway, and limited to the recent period 2006-2009 (section 4); the 
second is based on qualitative case study research on the three most important defence 
export product types (weapon stations, ammunition, electronics), and how these have 
emerged historically and come to dominate the export markets in the last few years. 
The key results of the paper and the main implications for policy can be summarized 
under the following four points. 
First, public regulations and policy interventions in the defence industry are as well-
known extensive, and they do play an important role to foster the export performance 
of domestic firms in foreign markets. Specifically, both the quantitative firm-level 
analysis and the description of the three case studies indicate that offset agreements 
have had a clear role to overcome entry barriers and facilitate the initial penetration of 
Norwegian defence firms in international markets. However, as stated in the 
introduction of the article, the new EU Directive that is now starting to be 
implemented by EU members (and Norway) will gradually seek to introduce a greater 
degree of market liberalization and progressively limit the number and extent of offset 
agreements that national authorities will be allowed to stipulate (Edwards, 2011). This 
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implies that, in a long time horizon, defence enterprises will have to rely less and less 
on this type of instruments of national protection, and progressively base their 
international competitiveness solely on their own capabilities, competencies and 
strategies. 
This calls the attention to our second result. A summary description of Norwegian 
defence firms’ competencies and strategies leads to point out two distinct market 
trajectories. On the one hand, only a few large oligopolistic enterprises (e.g. 
Kongsberg and Nammo) have been able to maintain their dominant position for a long 
time and eventually configure themselves as internationally competitive system 
integrators and global players in a number of different areas (see the description of the 
first and the second case studies). This type of trajectory largely resembles what the 
recent international economics literature identifies as superstar exporters, i.e. large 
firms that due to their greater size, productivity and capital intensity, are able to 
overcome trade barriers and export in several different foreign markets. On the other 
hand, however, a distinct trajectory is traced by a bunch of SMEs that, despite their 
relatively smaller size and more narrow competence and product portfolio, have been 
able to achieve a solid international position by providing specialized equipment and 
precision instruments to large defence manufacturers in foreign countries – as 
discussed in the third case focusing on the export of defence electronics (e.g. the 
companies Thales Norway and Simrad Optronics). This second typology closely 
corresponds to what Pavitt (1984) defined as specialized suppliers firms. The 
Norwegian export patterns suggest that these, by achieving a high degree of 
specialization in a narrow range of industry segments, may turn out to have an 
important role to foster small countries’ participation in the global value chain. All in 
all, according to our empirical research, the key success factor that is common to both 
trajectories is not firm size per se but rather the set of core competencies that 
characterize each company. Thus, policy measures aimed at strengthening Norwegian 
firms’ international competitiveness should not only focus on the restricted core of 
large exporters but also introduce schemes to support further the foreign market 
penetration of smaller specialized suppliers. 
Thirdly, in such a highly sophisticated technological environment as the defence 
industry, firms’ core competencies are closely interwined with and strongly dependent 
on their technological capacity and innovative activities. Our empirical analysis has 
kept this aspect under close scrutiny. On the one hand, both the regression and the 
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case study results have highlighted the important role of the public S&T system as a 
key cooperation partner for innovative firms in the Norwegian defence sector – see in 
particular the key role played by the public research organization FFI for the initial 
development of all three products analyzed in our case studies. On the other hand, we 
have also focused on R&D intensity as a possibly important factor explaining firms’ 
export performance. Our regression results, though, fail to identify any statistically 
significant correlation between the two variables. The case studies did however shed 
further light on this result (or lack of such). In the defence industry, the lag between 
an R&D project and the phase of market (and foreign market) commercialization is 
typically quite long, so that it is difficult to measure this relationship within the 
context of a relatively short time span and dataset. The first and second of our case 
studies – on weapon systems and ammunition – do in fact indicate that the 
technologies underpinning these successful export products had in all cases been 
introduced several years (or even decades) before these became popular items in 
international defence markets. An implication for policy making here is that R&D 
projects – and particularly those funded by national agents through public 
procurement – should to the extent possible take into due account demand 
opportunities in overseas markets and their possible future prospects, since the export 
success of any new R&D project is highly dependent on the match between the 
technological and product characteristics, on the one hand, and market demand 
opportunities, on the other. 
The importance of demand opportunities and changing demand conditions leads to 
our fourth main conclusion. The defence market is typically characterized by 
fluctuating demand where one or few big, often public, customers are responsible for 
a large share of contracts. And since these large customers are highly dependent on 
political conditions and exogenous shocks, market demand is often characterized by 
strong uncertainty and volatility. Specifically, in the Norwegian case, an overly 
important factor to explain the recent export success for weapon systems and 
ammunition is the increased market opportunities that have been created in the last 
decade by international political developments and new military requirements 
determined by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although these political 
developments and the related changing demand conditions are to a large extent 
difficult to predict, an important factor that may partly alleviate this problem is user-
producer interactions, which is another crucial variable highlighted in our paper. In 
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fact, our results show that Norwegian defence firms regard advanced users in foreign 
markets as an important cooperation partner to commercialize their products overseas. 
To the extent that well developed and long lasting collaborations between domestic 
and foreign producers contribute to decrease transaction costs and lower entry barriers 
in international markets, international collaborative projects and joint ventures may 
represent an important strategy for firms to achieve a greater degree of certainty and 
predictability about future demand conditions and share the related risks with their 
international partners. This type of collaborative schemes does therefore represent a 
potentially relevant policy measure to foster defence firms’ efficiency and 
international activities. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Total export intensity 
 
34 0.31 0.33 0 1 
 
Defence export intensity 
 
33 0.27 0.39 0 1 
 
Firm size (number of employees) 
 
41 200.6 425.8 2 2009 
 
R&D intensity 
 
33 10.05 15.13 0 53.97 
 
Cooperation with the public science system 
 
44 2.11 1.06 1 4 
 
Advanced users in foreign markets 
 
43 2.79 1.03 1 4 
 
Focus on core competencies 
 
44 2.57 0.97 1 4 
 
Offset agreements 
 
43 0.60 0.49 0 1 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
Total export 
intensity 
 
Defence 
export 
intensity 
 
Firm size 
(number of 
employees) 
 
Focus on core 
competencies 
 
Advanced users 
in foreign 
markets 
 
Cooperation 
with the public 
science system 
 
Offset 
agreements 
 
R&D 
intensity 
 
Total export intensity 
 
1 
       
 
Defence export intensity 
 
0.73 
 
1 
      
 
Firm size (number of employees) 
 
0.44 
 
0.09 
 
1 
     
 
Focus on core competencies 
 
0.40 
 
0.57 
 
0.15 
 
1 
    
 
Advanced users in foreign markets 
 
0.44 
 
0.52 
 
0.12 
 
0.08 
 
1 
   
 
Cooperation with the public science system 
 
0.55 
 
0.44 
 
0.29 
 
0.07 
 
0.32 
 
1 
  
 
Offset agreements 
 
0.22 
 
0.28 
 
0.31 
 
0.13 
 
0.04 
 
0.00 
 
1 
 
 
R&D intensity 
 
0.02 0.02 -0.14 -0.14 0.23 0.49 -0.26 1 
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Table 3: Regression results: The determinants of total export intensity  
 
 
 
     OLS 
 
   Tobit  
 Median  
regression 
      2SLS      IV Tobit  
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Firm size (number of employees) 
 
0.0002 
(1.54) 
0.0002 
(2.18)** 
0.0002 
(1.62) 
0.0002 
(2.38)** 
0.0002 
(1.72)* 
0.0002 
(2.82)*** 
0.0002 
(1.47) 
0.0002 
(1.89)* 
0.002 
(1.67)* 
0.0002 
(1.91)* 
 
R&D intensity 
 
-0.0026 
(0.49) 
0.0025 
(0.51) 
-0.0033 
(0.74) 
0.0024 
(0.52) 
-0.0009 
(0.20) 
0.0002 
(0.07) 
-0.003 
(0.52) 
0.0007 
(0.14) 
0.0005 
(0.07) 
0.0016 
(0.28) 
 
Cooperation with the public science system 
 
0.132 
(2.02)** 
 
0.149 
(2.50)*** 
 
0.105 
(1.58) 
 
0.108 
(1.49) 
 
0.033 
(0.37) 
 
 
Advanced users in foreign markets 
 
0.078 
(1.30) 
0.112 
(1.81)* 
0.076 
(1.42) 
0.113 
(2.02)* 
0.069 
(1.26) 
0.157 
(2.73)*** 
0.160 
(1.68)* 
0.220 
(2.25)** 
0.244 
(2.17)** 
0.263 
(2.51)** 
 
Focus on core competencies 
 
0.119 
(2.16)** 
0.125 
(2.13)** 
0.126 
(2.56)*** 
0.131 
(2.43)** 
0.105 
(1.96)* 
0.122 
(2.15)** 
0.116 
(1.96)* 
0.119 
(1.84)* 
0.109 
(1.66)* 
0.109 
(1.63) 
 
Offset agreements 
 
0.018 
(0.15) 
0.029 
(0.23) 
0.022 
(0.21) 
0.034 
(0.29) 
0.140 
(1.30) 
0.161 
(1.33) 
0.005 
(0.04) 
0.011 
(0.08) 
0.061 
(0.41) 
0.062 
(0.41) 
 
Constant 
 
-0.501 
(2.27)** 
-0.407 
(1.77)* 
-0.537 
(2.71)*** 
-0.424 
(2.01)* 
-0.491 
(2.83)*** 
-0.570 
(2.48)** 
-0.651 
(2.32)** 
-0.647 
(2.11)** 
-0.826 
(2.48)** 
-0.827 
(2.43)* 
 
R
2 
(or pseudo R
2
) 
 
0.525 0.433 0.887 0.645 0.418 0.367 0.466 0.332 - - 
 
Significance levels: 
***
 1%; 
**
 5%; 
*
 10%. Regressions (7) to (10): Endogenous variable: Advanced users in foreign markets; Instrumental variables: (1) Cooperation with 
foreign competitors; (2) Internationalization strategy. 
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Table 4: Regression results: The determinants of defence export intensity  
 
 
 
      OLS 
 
    Tobit  
  Median    
regression 
      2SLS       IV Tobit  
 
 
(11) 
 
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 
Firm size (number of employees) 
 
-0.0002 
(1.95)* 
-0.0001 
(0.75) 
-0.0002 
(2.44)** 
-0.0001 
(0.99) 
-0.0002 
(2.31)** 
-0.0001 
(0.54) 
-0.0002 
(1.91)* 
-0.0001 
(0.81) 
-0.0002 
(1.63) 
-0.0001 
(0.70) 
 
R&D intensity 
 
-0.0063 
(1.33) 
0.0011 
(0.24) 
-0.0073 
(1.65) 
0.0016 
(0.35) 
-0.0054 
(1.13) 
0.0005 
(0.14) 
-0.0062 
(1.27) 
0.0002 
(0.04) 
-0.0089 
(1.09) 
-0.0000 
(0.00) 
 
Cooperation with the public science system 
 
0.174 
(3.00)*** 
 
0.197 
(3.51)*** 
 
0.106 
(1.89)* 
 
0.175 
(2.92)*** 
 
0.237 
(2.23)** 
 
 
Advanced users in foreign markets 
 
0.173 
(3.27)*** 
0.202 
(3.31)*** 
0.181 
(3.79)*** 
0.217 
(3.76)*** 
0.198 
(3.83)*** 
0.231 
(3.76)*** 
0.181 
(2.37)** 
0.269 
(2.92)*** 
0.266 
(2.08)** 
0.441 
(3.03)*** 
 
Focus on core competencies 
 
0.196 
(4.10)*** 
0.211 
(3.78)*** 
0.212 
(4.85)*** 
0.229 
(4.32)*** 
0.262 
(5.01)*** 
0.253 
(4.25)*** 
0.193 
(3.91)*** 
0.202 
(3.41)*** 
0.282 
(3.44)*** 
0.276 
(2.90)*** 
 
Offset agreements 
 
0.188 
(1.84)* 
0.192 
(1.60) 
0.209 
(2.26)** 
0.217 
(1.92)* 
0.126 
(1.03) 
0.045 
(0.34) 
0.201 
(1.85)* 
0.202 
(1.54) 
0.322 
(1.85)* 
0.370 
(1.75)* 
 
Constant 
 
-1.019 
(5.38)*** 
-0.883 
(4.09)*** 
-1.115 
(6.26)*** 
-0.971 
(4.65)*** 
-1.087 
(5.34)*** 
-0.990 
(4.31)*** 
-1.048 
(4.61)*** 
-1-033 
(3.77)*** 
-1.804 
(4.20)*** 
-1.953 
(3.73)*** 
 
R
2 
(or pseudo R
2
) 
 
0.731 0.609 1.130 0.802 0.524 0.420 0.727 0.583 - - 
 
Significance levels: 
***
 1%; 
**
 5%; 
*
 10%. Regressions (17) to (20): Endogenous variable: Advanced users in foreign markets; Instrumental variables: (1) Cooperation with 
foreign competitors; (2) Internationalization strategy. 
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Table 5: Total Norwegian export in the defence industry, 2000-2009. 
 
 
 
Source: statistics from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Norwegian export of electronics products and equipment, 2003-2009. 
 
 
 
Source: statistics from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 
 
 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
Item Description
1 Hand weapons for military or other purposes 184 510 000 146 089 400 60 660 000 24 488 000 25 540 000 11 436 000 13 134 000 3 446 000 526 000 5 042 000
2 Artillery etc. 20 743 000 2 217 000 10 918 000 13 866 000 23 136 000 174 045 000 436 461 000 12 976 000 8 230 000 510 000
3 Missile systems bombs, rockets, torpedoes, mines and hand granades130 254 000 86 249 000 165 334 000 156 070 000 55 779 000 98 710 000 613 356 000 266 283 000 33 382 000 77 865 000
4 Fire control, search, handling and counter-measure equipment1 995 253 000 1 859 808 000 1 187 150 000 878 628 000 803 017 000 372 141 000 639 090 000 119 216 000 47 569 000 4 149 000
5 ABC-weapons etc 737 000 199 000 1 040 000 0 611 000 837 000 663 000 0 0 0
6 Ammunition, explosives, etc 807 014 000 563 931 406 546 534 000 671 676 430 564 642 000 310 410 640 387 152 000 304 236 000 268 669 000 258 448 000
7 Electronic equipment, etc., not included in item 4 917 359 000 804 150 000 712 513 600 476 292 000 578 678 000 534 955 016 361 518 000 177 544 000 384 295 000 374 072 000
8 Vessels and under water equipment 15 679 000 13 924 000 4 466 000 96 937 000 72 685 000 47 017 000 34 371 000 0 0 0
9 Aerial vehicles etc. 167 170 000 76 620 000 198 944 000 207 653 000 200 707 000 271 194 000 320 549 000 0 0 0
10 Tanks, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles constructed for military purposes 6 191 000 87 209 000 29 455 000 83 427 000 34 633 000 90 115 000 83 180 000 40 000 11 476 000 0
11 Protection and rescue equipment designed for military purposes5 776 000 3 234 670 3 877 000 0 0 38 000 0 0 0 0
12 Hangars, containers and tents developed for military purposes 0 0 100 000 9 252 000 10 343 000 0 0 0 0 0
13 Camouflage equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 Photo materiel 0 0 0 0 0 362 000 0 0 0 0
15 Quartermaster supplies: clothes, fuel, office equipment etc. developed for military purposes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 Simulators specially constructed or modified for training on the use of material mention in 1-15 above.152 254 000 203 555 000 212 345 000 43 657 000 10 344 000 3 458 000 43 186 000 820 000 50 799 000 7 920 000
18 Software 27 809 000 15 429 000 40 267 000 8 520 000 22 061 000 85 600 000 12 975 000 7 452 000 25 289 000 4 400 000
19 Materials, machines and tools etc. 51 436 000 5 903 000 17 710 000 234 063 000 14 520 000 3 631 000 33 023 000 16 228 000 15 994 000 9 596 000
20 Technologies connected to equipment mention under 1-19 above.7 152 000 5 153 000 639 000 5 615 000 7 055 000 1 526 000 38 734 000 0 3 287 000 12 000
(17) (Parts) 1 387 742 000 753 164 000 319 154 000
Total 4 499 337 000 3 873 671 476 3 191 952 600 2 910 144 430 2 423 751 000 2 005 475 656 3 017 392 000 2 295 983 000 1 602 680 000 1 061 168 000
kr 0
kr 100 000 000
kr 200 000 000
kr 300 000 000
kr 400 000 000
kr 500 000 000
kr 600 000 000
kr 700 000 000
kr 800 000 000
kr 900 000 000
kr 1 000 000 000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General electronics
Night vision
Radar, laser, sonar
Communications
Crypto
